

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9036

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 4 BRASILIA 3472

E.O.11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, BR

SUBJECT: OVERVIEW FOR THE CASP

1. THE THEME THAT UNDERLIES THIS YEAR'S CASP IS THE NEED FOR US, FIRST, TO RECOGNIZE THAT BRAZIL CONTINUES TO BE IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION: AND, SECOND, TO DESIGN A STRATEGY THAT PROTECTS AND ADVANCES US INTERESTS IN THE CURRENT PAHSE OF THAT TRANSITION, AND THAT AT THE SAME TIME DOES NOT COMPROMISE THOSE INTERESTS IN THE LONGER RUN.

2. THE TRANSITION, WHICH BEGAN CONCEPTUALLY IN THE LATE FIFTIES AND GAINED ITS PRESENT IMPULSE IN THE 1967-1968 PERIOD, CAN PERHAPS BEST BE DEFINED BY DESCRIBING IN OUTLINE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE BRAZIL WHICH, ASSUMING ALL GOES WELL, WE WILL BE DEALING WITH IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE EIGHTIES AND THE BRAZIL WHICH THIS CASP ADDRESSES. IN THE 1980-1985 PERIOD, BRAZIL WILL HAVE, NO COMPLETELY BUT ESSENTIALLY, A DEVELOPED, RATHER THAN ITS PRESENT SEMI-DEVELOPED, ECONOMY: IT MAY BE CLOSE TO SELF-SUFFICIENT IN PETROLEUM INSTEAD OF BEING A MAJOR IMPORTER: IT WILL PROBABLY HAVE THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY THAT NOW IT ONLY IS BEGINNING TO SEEK: TO THE EXTENT THAT ANY COUNTRY COULD BE SAID TO BE INDEPENDENT IN THE INTERDEPENDENT WORLD OF THE EIGHTIES,

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BRAZIL WILL BE FREE OF THE RESTRAINTS THAT ITS CURRENT

SITUATION IMPOSES: IT WILL BE, IN SHORT, A MIDDLE POWER
IN THE WORLD, WITH AMBITIONS FOR EVEN HIGHER, MAJOR-POWER
STATUS, RATHER THAN THE SOMETIMES FUBLING BUT ALWAYS
DETERMINED ASPIRANT IT NOW IS.

3. THIS POTENTIAL BRAZIL WILL REPRESENT THE ESSENTIAL
REALIZATION OF THE GRANDEZA THAT HAS BEEN THE BRAZILIAN
NATIONAL GOAL SINCE THE REVOLUTION OF 1964. THERE CAN
BE NO DOOOUT BUT THAT THE GEISEL ADMINISTRATION HAS DEMONSTRATED,
IN ITS FIRST YEAR, UNQUALIFIED FIDELITY TO THE
GOAL OF GRANDEZA. ITS PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
NATIONAL SECURITY, THE INTERTWINED MEANS OF ACHIEVEMENT OF
GRANDEZA, HAS BEEN AS DETERMINED AS THAT OF ITS PREDECESSORS,
EVEN THOUGH ITS VISION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES TRUE
DEVELOPMENT AND TRUE SECURITY IS MORE SOPHISTICATED,
MORE ENCOMPASSING AND MORE SENSITIVE TO THE REQUIREMENTS
OF AN INCREASINGLY COMPLEX SOCIETY THAN THEIRS WAS. MOREOVER,
A COMBINATION OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS HAS
CREATED CONSTRAINTS ON THE PACE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
THAT WERE NOT PRESENT IN THE AQOYIAQQUE PERIOD OF THE REVOLUTION
AND DELIBERATELY IGNORED AND SUPPRESSED IN THE LAST
YEAR OF THE MEDICI GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THE NATION'S
GOAL CONTINUES TO BE AS VALID FOR THE GEISEL GOVERNMENT
AS IT WAS FOR MEDICI'S. IT IS IN THE GEISEL PERIOD, HOWEVER,
THAT THE ADVANCE TOWARD GRANDEZA IS INTENDED TO BE
MADE IRREVERSIBLE AND SELF-SUSTAINING. THIS INTENTION, EXPLICITLY
EXPRESSED IN THE SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN
(II PND), GIVES SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS YEAR'S CASP,
WHICH COVERS THE MIDDLE YEARS OF GEISEL'S TENURE.

4. WE DO NOT HAVE, IN THE FIELD OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY,
A GUIDE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF NATIONAL GREATNESS AS CLEAR
AS THAT PROVIDED IN THE II PND. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, SIGNPOSTS
IN THE FORM OF SLOGANS, WHICH ARE PARTIALLY CATCHWORDS
BUT IN A VERY REAL SENSE ALSO CONCEPTS GOVERNING THE
CONDUCT OF BRAZIL'S EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. I REFER TO: "RESPONSIBLE
PRAGMATISM", "ECUMENISM", "NO AUTOMATIC ALIGNMENTS",
"UNSATELLIZING AND UNSATELLIZABLE BRAZIL", AND THE MOST
RECENT, "HORIZONTAL INTERDEPENDENCE, YES: VERTICAL INTERDEPENDENCE,
NO". SOME OF THESE APPLY TO POLITICAL CONCERNs,

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ALL OF THEM APPLY TO ECONOMIC CONCERNs. TRANSLATED INTO
OPERATING GUIDELINES, THEY MEAN: (A) BRAZIL WILL NOT BE
TAKEN FOR GRANTED: (B) BRAZIL WILL CONDUCT ITS FOREIGN
RELATIONS ON THE BASIS OF STRICT, UNSENTIMENTAL ATTENTION
TO ITS OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS: (C) BRAZIL WILL GUARD ITS
FREEDOM OF ACTION JEALOUSLY: (D) A CARDINAL INTEREST IS
THE REDISTRIBUTION OF WORLD ECONOMIC WEALTH AND POWER:
(E) DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WILL RESIST THIS REDISTRIBUTION:

(F) ALLIANCE WITH THE LDC/THIRD WORLD GROUP ON ECONOMIC MATTERS PROVIDES EFFECTIVE LEVERAGE ON THE DC'S IN THE SHORT- AND MID-TERM: (G) PRAGMATISM, CONTINUING MID-TERM DEPENDENCE ON DC ECONOMIC GOOD-WILL, CONSERVATISM, AND EXPECTATION OF EVENTUAL GRADUATION INTO DE RANKS COUNSEL AGAINST OPEN CONFRONTATION WITH THE DC'S AND AGAINST ALIGNMENT WITH THE LDC'S/THIRD WORLD ON POLITICAL MATTERS: (H) DIVERSIFICATION OF SOURCES OF FINANCING IMPORTS AND TECHNOLOGY AND MARKETS FOR EXPORTS IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE IN POLITICAL AS WELL AS ECMNOMIC TERMS: (I) THE CONCEPT OF INTERDEPENDENCE ADVANCED BY THE US HAS TO BE WATCHED CLOSELY LEST IT BE USED AS A DEVICE FOR FREEZING THE PRESENT WORLD ECONOMIC STRUCTURES TO THE DETRIMENT OF BRAZILIAN UPWARD MOBILITY: AND (J) NEVER TRUST A SUPERPOWER.

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FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9037

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5. THIS LISTING OF OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, WHILE NOT EXHAUSTIVE, IS SUFFICIENT TO DEFINE THE PROBABLY ENVIORMENT IN WHICH US INTERESTS CONCENING BRAZIL WILL BE PURUED DURING THE CASP PERIOD AND FOR A CONSIDERABLE TIME THEREAFTER. THAT ENVIRONMENT IS NOT AND WILL NOT BE SO HOSPITABLE AS WE WOULD LIKE TI TO BE. IT IS VERY FAR FROM BEING IMPOSSIBLE, HOWEVER. WE WILL CONTINUE TO BER VERY IMPORTANT TO BRAZIL ECONOMICALLY AND FINACIALLY DURING THE ENTIRE PROCESS OF THE BRAZILIAN STRUGGLE FOR SELFFULFILLMENT. AS THAT SELFFULFILLMENT BECOMES MORE AND

MORE RELAIZABLE, OUR IMPORTANCE WILL DIMINISH BUT CERTAINLY
FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS OUR ECONOMIC USEFULNESS WILL
ATTENUATE--NOT REMOVE-- THE FACTORS OF CONFLICT.

6. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, OUR SECURITY SHIELD AGAINST
THE USSR WILL CONTINUE TO BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED (EVEN IN
THE FACE OF DOUBTS ABOUT OUR WILL, FOR BRAZIL HAS NO ALTERNATIVE)
AND WILL NOT PROVIDE US, FOR OBVIOUS REASONS OF
OUR OWN SELF-INTEREST, ANY KIND OF APPRECIABLE LEVERAGE,
BUT IT WILL RETAIN A SYMBOLIC, POSITIVE EFFECT. ON PURELY
POLITICAL EAST-WEST ISSUES, BRAZIL'S CONSERVATISM WILL
KEEP IT, FOR THE NEXT TWO TO FIVE YEARS, ON OUR SIDE.

7. I AM TEMPTED TO SAY THAT IS IS IN THE ECONOMIC
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SPHERE, THEN, THAT OUR INTERESTS WILL BE CHALLENGED AND
OUR OPPORTUNITIES WILL ARISE. ALTHOUGH THAT JUDGMENT IS,
I BELIEVE, BASICALLY CORRECT, I MUST CALL ATTENTION TO THE
HIGHLY POLITICAL CONTENT OF THE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
QUESTION ADDRESSED FITTINGLY (BUT PERHAPS WISTFULLY, IN
LIGHT OF VERY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS) AS ISSUE 1 OF THIS
YEAR'S CASP. I AM NOT AT ALL SURE RIGHT NOW ABOUT THE
REALISM OF THE RECOMMENDED RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE IN
TERMS OF PROTECTING OUR ECONOMIC PROPERTY INTEREST, BUT
I AM SURE THAT THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF BRAZIL'S SEARCH
FOR THE FULL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY--TO IT, THE QUINTESSENCE,
PERHAPS, OF INDEPENDENT POWER AS WELL AS PROTECTION AGAINST
AN ARGENTINE THREAT-- WILL HOVER OVER OUR RELATIONSHIP FOR
SEVERAL YEARS. HOW FAR WE ARE PREPARED TO GO IN RESTRAINING
BRAZIL IS A MAJOR QUESTION, THE ANSWER TO WHICH LIES
IN THE REALM OF HIGH WASHINGTON POLICY. SOME PROPOSALS
ARE OFFERED IN THE CASP.

8. IMPORTANT THOUGH THE POLITICAL ISSUES DISCUSSED ABOVE
ARE, IT IS IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL
TASK OF US POLICY IN THE CASP PERIOD AND WELL BEYOND IT
WILL BE MOST CLEARLY DELINEATED. IF WE ARE RIGHT WHEN
WE SAY IN INTERESTS ANALYSIS AND ISSUES SECTIONS THAT
THE CHALLENGE TO POLICY IS TO MAKE BRAZIL'S EVOLVING ROLE
IN THE WORLD AS COMPATIBLE AS POSSIBLE WITH OUR VISION OF
THE WORLD AND THAT WE MUST ATTEMPT TO KEEP OUR INTERESTS
AND THOSE OF BRAZIL AS CONVERGENT AS POSSIBLE IN THIS
TRANSITION PERIOD, THEN THE PRINCIPAL TESTS WILL SURELY
COME AND THE GREAT PROBLEMS OF INTERDEPENDENCE. THE
TESTS WILL BE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT BECAUSE, IN MY OPINION,
BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES ARE IN BASIC CONFLICT. WE
ARE NOT POLITICALLY OR PSYCHOLOGICALLY OR ECONOMICALLY
PREPARED TO GIVE MORE THAN PALLIATIVE RESPONSES TO THE
FUNDAMENTAL BRAZILIAN DEMAND FOR A REDISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC

WEALTH AND POWER. I BELIEVE THAT WE ACCEPT, EVEN WELCOME, THE PROSPECT OF BRAZIL AS AN AMERGING WORLD POWER: WE ACKNOWLEDGE INTELLECTULLY THE NEED TO WORK TO MAKE BRAZIL A COOPERATIVE PARTNER ON THE WORLD SCENE: BUT WE HAVE GREAT TROUBLE WHEN WE FACE THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCEY OF BRAZIL'S DRIVE. WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT, WHEN WE RECOIL FROM THOSE CONSEQUENCES OR HAVE TO OPPOSE THEM, WE ARE

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JEOPARDIZING OUR PRESENT AND OUR FUTUE INTERESTS-- ALL OF THEM, NOT ONLY THE PURELY ECONOMIC ONES. THE FRAMING OF THE TWO ECONOMIC ISSUES IN THE CASP IS INTENDED TO IDENTIFY THE CURRENT EFFECTS OF THE NDERLYING CONFLICT AND TO PROPOSE WAYS TO AMELIORATE IT. THE RECOMMENDED RESOLTUIONS ARE DESIGNED TO LIMIT DAMAGE, TO INJECT AS MUCH POSITIVE CONTENT INTO THE ELATIONSHIP AS POSSIBLE IN THE CASP PERIOD, AND TO AVOID PREJUDICE TO THE LONGER TERM PLAY OF OUR BROAD INTERESTS.

9. THE "MILITARY" ISSUE IN THE CASP IS RELATED TO THE PROTECTION AND ADVANCEMENT OF OUR BROAD INTERESTS IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD IN THE SENSE THAT OUR MILITARY PRESENCE IN BRAZIL AND THE PROGRAMS WE MAINTAIN WRE DESIGNED TO KEEP OPEN CANNELS TO THE INFLUENTIAL BRAZILIAN MILITARY, PRESERVE THEIR CURRENT BASICALLY FRIENDLY ORIENTATION AND TO IMPROVE OUR SALES POSITION. THE QUESTION OF WHAT CONTIRUBITION THE BRAZILIAN CAPABILITIES SUPPORTED BY OUR MILITARY PROGRAMS MAKE TO OUR OWN DEFENSE IS STILL OPEN, SO FAR AS I AM CONCERNED.

10. THE ISSUE OF THE OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN BRAZIL IS AS DIFFICULT TO ADDRESS AS IT IS IMPORTANT. THE RECOMMENDED RESOLUTION OF THEISSUE IN THE CASP SEEKS TO RECONCILE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM FOR US AND THE GREAT SENSTIVITIES IN OFFICIAL BRAZIL. IT IS A RSASONABLE FORMULA. THE KEY TO ANY EFFECTIVENESS N THIS DELICATE FIELD WILL BE THE STEADFAST READINESS OF SENIOR WASHINGTON AUTHORITIES TO SUPPORT RESPONSIBLE ACTIONS IN THE FIELD TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO STANDING INSTRUCTIONS AND TO ACCEPT THE SOMETIMES UNPLEASANT CONSEQUENCES ON OTHER INTERESTS.

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FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9038

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11. THE MAIN BODY OF THE CASP, PARTICULARLY THE ANALYSIS OF INTERESTS SECTION AND IN A MORE DETAILED WAY THE INSSUES SECTION, AND THE DISCUSSION IN THIS OVERVIEW INDICATE THE ELEMENTS OF THE BROAD STRATEGY THAT THE EMBASSY RECOMMENDS. THE STRATEGY IS BASED ON THE FIRM BELIEF THAT, IN TERMS OF OUR WORLD ORDER INTEREST, BRAZIL'S EMERGENCE AS A WORLD POWER GIVES IT UNIQUE IMPORTANCE FOR US IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE LESS-DEVELOPED WORLD IN GENERAL, AN IMPORTANCE THAT TRANSCENDS EVEN OUR VERY SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC STAKES (THE ECONOMIC PROSPERITY INTEREST), WHICH IN THEMSELVES SET BRAZIL APART FROM THE GREAT BULK OF THE LDC'S. THE PURPOSE OF THE STRATEGY IS TO INFLUENCE BRAZIL'S FORMATION AS A WORLD POWER SO THAT IT WILL BE A COOPERATIVE, WELL-DISPOSED NEW FORCE ON THE WORLD SCENE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE STRATEGY IS DESIGNED TO MEET ISSUES IN THE SHORT RUN (THE CASP PERIOD) IN SUCH A WAY AS TO SERVE, OR AT THE LEAST NOT TO PREJUDICE, THE LONG-TERM PURPOSE.

12. THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF THE STRATEGY ARE:
- WE SHOULD ACCEPT BRAZIL'S DRIVE FOR WORLD POWER STATUS AND IDENTIFY OURSELVES WITH IT.
- WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT BRAZIL WILL USE ITS LDC STATUS AS PRESSURE FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. EXCEPT FOR BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, WE CAN ACCEPT THAT
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SELF-DEFINITION THROUGH THE CASP PERIOD.
- WE SHOULD AVOID, HOWEVER, THE AUTOMATIC APPLICATION OF "STANDARD" LATIN AMERICAN OR LDC TREATMENT TO BRAZIL AND SHOULD ALWAYS KEEP IN MIND ITS UNIQUE ATTRIBUTES

AS AN EMERGING WORLD POWER.

- OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH BRAZIL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ON THE BILATERAL PLANE TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE.

- WE SHOULD TAKE BRAZILIAN POSITIONS AND INTERESTS INTO CAREFUL ACCOUNT IN THE PREPARATION OF US POLICY ON MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, AND WE SHOULD MAKE SPECIAL EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN A SERIOUS, FRANK AND DETAILED DIALOGUE WITH BRAZIL ON THOSE ISSUES.

- BECAUSE OF THE UNDERLYING CONFLICT BETWEEN BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC ASPIRATIONS AND DEMANDS AND OUR OWN CONSTRAINTS, OUR TAKING INTO ACCOUNT BRAZILIAN INTERESTS CANNOT MEAN

FULL ACCEPTANCE OF THEM. WE MUST BE PREPARED TO BE AS UNSENTIMENTAL IN THE PROTECTION OF OUR LEGITIMATE INTERESTS AS BRAZIL IS.

- WE SHOULD, BY WORD AND DEED, GET ACROSS TO BRAZIL THAT INCREASED INFLUENCE BRINGS WITH IT INCREASED RESPONSIBILITIES.

- WE SHOULD BE SCRUPULOUSLY CAREFUL, HOWEVER, TO SEEK, THROUGH DIALOGUE, ACCOMMODATION AND MITIGATION OF CONFLICTS WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

- WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT A FAVORABLE CLIMATE FOR THE PURSUIT OF OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS IS DIRECTLY LINKED TO THE DEGREE OF OUR ACCOMMODATION TO BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC INTERESTS.

- WE SHOULD GUARD AGAINST GIVING BRAZILIAN OPINIONS EXCESSIVE WEIGHT IN OUR DEALINGS WITH OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

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13. THE STRATEGY OUTLINED ABOVE IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS WILL CONTINUE THROUGH THE CASP PERIOD AND WELL BEYOND IT. THAT ASSUMPTION IS REASONABLE BUT NOT, OF COURSE, SOLID. WE DO EXPECT THIS YEAR AND PROBABLY NEXT YEAR AN APPRECIABLE DROP IN THE RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH SO THAT THE PERIOD IN WHICH BRAZIL CAN ACHIEVE A DEVELOPED ECONOMY WILL HAVE TO

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BE STRETCHED OUT. SPECIFICALLY, I AM VERY DOUBTFUL THAT THE TARGETS FIXED IN THE II PND FOR FULFILLMENT IN 1980 CAN BE REACHED BY THAT DATE. (WE HAVE ACCOMMODATED THAT SLIPPAGE BY USING THE FIRST HALF OF THE EIGHTIES AS THE PERIOD IN WHICH BRAZIL'S ECONOMY WILL BE MORE OR LESS DEVELOPED.) NEVERTHELESS, WE ESTIMATE THAT THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY HAS A CONSIDERABLY BETTER THAN EVEN CHANCE OF OVERCOMING CURRENT DIFFICULTIES.

14. THE POLITICAL SITUATION INSPIRES GREATER RESERVATIONS. THE DECOMPRESSION PROCESS HAS PRODUCED THE INEVITABLE

BACKLASH FROM CONSERVATIVE MILITARY SECTORS, WITH THE SECURITY APPARATUS MOST STRONGLY OPPOSED. PRESSURES ON PRESIDENT GEISEL HAVE BEEN QUITE HEAVY: AND, ALTHOUGH HE CONTINUES TO GIVE INDICATIONS OF A DETERMINATION TO STICK TO HIS BELIEF IN THE NECESSITY OF DECOMPRESSION, WE JUDGE THAT ITS FATE IS STILL HANGING.

15. IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL HOW THE DEBATES NOW GOING ON WITHIN THE SYSTEM WILL TURN OUT, BUT THREE GROSS ALTERNATIVE COURSES CAN BE DISCERNED: (A) A CONTINUATION OF THE GRADUAL, CONTROLLED OPENING OF THE SYSTEM UNDER GEISEL'S CONTROL, WITH THE PRINCIPAL RISK TO THE REGIME BEING A VICTORY BY THE OPPOSITION MDB IN THE DIRECT GUBERNATORIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS OF 1978: (B) A RETURN TO A REPRESSIVE POLICY BY GEISEL UNDER HARDLINE PRESSURE, OR, IN EXTREMIS, SUCH A RETURN FOLLOWING THE REMOVAL OF GEISEL BY MILITARY ELEMENTS FEARFUL OF THE EFFECTS OF DECOMPRESSION.

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FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9039

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SUCH A REGRESSION WHICH COULD OCCUR BETWEEN NOWIAND THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS OF 1976, AFTER AN ARENA DEFEAT IN 1976, OR AFTER AN ARENA DEFEAT IN 1978, MIGHT BE ACCCOMPANIED BY A MUCH

STRONGER NATIONALIST LINE, IF ONLY TO CARRY POPULAR SUPPORT. IN EIHER CASE, MY OWN BELIEF IS THAT SUCH A POLICY COULD HOLD FOR ONLY TWO-THREE YEARS,

WITH THE EVENTUAL CONSEQUENCE BEING A MARKEDLY UNSTABLE AND VOLATILE SITUATION: (C) THE TAKE-OVER OF GOVERNMENT AS A RESULT OF EITYER THE 1978 ELELCTIONS OR THE UNSTABLE, POLARIZED SITUATION REFERRED TO IN (B), BY FORCESOPPOSED TO OR UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE REVOLUTION.

16. IN CASES (B) AND (C), THE BRAZILIAN DRIVE TO POWER STATUS WOULD PROBABLY BE SLOWED OR STOPPED. IN ADDITION, THE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, WHICH INVOPULAR OPINION HAS BEENSIDENTIFIED WITH THE REVOLUTION EVER SINCE 1964, WOULD BE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY NATIONALIST, LEFTIST BACKLASH. THESE LATTER TWO CONTINGENCIES DO NOT REPRESENT THE MOST LIKELY COURSE OF EVENTS AND, IN ANY CASE, THEY FALL PRINCIPALLY OUTSIDE THE TIME FRAME OF THE CASP. NONETHELESS, THEY ARE FAR FROM UNTHUNKABLE. WE HAVE THEM DEFINITELY IN MIND IN

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THE SENSE THAT WE ARE KEEPING OUR CURRENTLY VERY GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE OPPOSITION IN REPAIR AS PART OF AN EFFORT TO POSITION OURSELVES AGAINST A POSSIBLE MAJOR CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMIC CLIMATE. IN THE ECONOMIC AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN THE CASP, OUR RECOMMENDATIONS ALSO REFLECT THIS KIND OF CONCERN. BECAUSE OF OUR IDENTIFICATION WITH THE REVOLUTION, PARTICULARLY THE MASSIVE ECONOMIC SUPPORT PROVIDED IN THE 1964-1969 PERIOD AND THE UBIQUITOUSNESS OF OUR ECONOMIC PRESSURE, IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED, HOWEVER, THAT THE DIE HAS BEEN EFFECIVELY CAST AND THAT, SHOULD THE NEGATIVE CONTINGENCIES COME TO PASS, OUR CURRENT EFFORTS WOULD HAVE LIMITED EFFECT. THERE ARE MANY POLICY REASONS FOR WISHING PRESIDENT GEISEL WELL IN HIS ADVOCACY OF DECOMPRESSION. THE ALTERNATIVES TO THE CONTINUATION OF THAT DELICATE PROCESS ONLY REINFORCE THOSE REASONS.

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